IMMIGRATION AND THE VULNERABLE
WORKER: WE BUILT THIS COUNTRY ON
CHEAP LABOR
Leila Higgins*
I. INTRODUCTION
In early 2012, the Department of Labor took an unexpected step in
support of immigrant workers, changing the way H-2B visas are issued to
make it harder both to hire and to exploit immigrant workers.1 The changes
in regulation were the result of years of hard work by advocates for both
Union workers, and immigrants.2 However, by the end of the summer of
2012, the new regulations had been challenged by employers in several
federal courts, and repealed by the Senate.3 The employers resisted the
immigration changes that would affect their bottom line and won; the
advocates’ work was undone.4 This is not an isolated example of the power
and influence employers have over the creation and enforcement of this
country’s immigration laws.5 Not every instance of employer action,
*
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1
See Leila Higgins, Comite de Apoyo a los Trabajadores Agricolas v. Solis and 20
C.F.R. § 655; 29 C.F.R. § 503 Final Rule Developments, LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT
LAW FORUM (2012), available at http://aulaborlawforum.org/recent-developments/ (last
visited Apr. 14, 2013).
2
20 C.F.R. § 655; 29 C.F.R. § 503; see also Jayesh Rathod & Adrienne Lockie,
Picked Apart: The Hidden Struggles of Migrant Worker Women in the Maryland Crab
Industry, AM. U. WASH. C. OF L.: FAC. SCHOLARSHIP & RES. (2010), available at
http://www.wcl.american.edu/clinical/documents/20100714_auwcl_ihrlc_picked_
apart.pdf?rd=1 (documenting the experiences of hundreds of Mexican women as they
traveled to the United States under temporary guestworker visas to participate in the
Maryland crab industry).
3
Daniel Costa, Employer Criticisms of New Immigration Rules are not Credible,
THE HILL (Mar. 6, 2012), available at http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/economya-budget/214433-employer-criticisms-of-new-immigration-rules-are-not-credible (last
visited Apr. 12, 2013).
4
See Costa, supra note 3.
5
Prior to the Chinese Exclusion Acts and federal involvement in immigration,
employers reached out to other nations that could provide cheap labor and sponsored
massive immigration movements, which then led to inspired regulation. During World
War II, employers appealed to the government to provide them with cheap labor from
America’s neighbors, arguing that their fruit was rotting in the fields without immigrant
farm workers, creating the Bracero Program. After 1986, despite Congress’ best
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however, seeks to further disadvantage the already vulnerable immigrant
worker population.6 By appreciating the ability of employers to influence
immigration law, advocates stand a much better chance of seeing change
that can stand the test of time. Appreciating the power of forces that can
collapse immigration reform efforts is particularly important now, as
Congress begins to discuss and to implement a Comprehensive
Immigration Reform package that, hopefully, will fix the errors of the
past.7
Employers tend to prefer the more vulnerable employees,8 those who
will work for lower wages under cheaper conditions and for longer hours
than empowered employees.9 Despite the fact that immigrant workers,
whether documented or not, are entitled by law to the same working
standards as less vulnerable workers, industry practice often provides
working conditions reflective of the laborers vulnerability.10 Vulnerable

legislative efforts, employers undercut IRCA by reacting to the poorly executed
sanctions program and appealing to their political representatives, arguing that IRCA
was leaving their fields and factories untended. See Dianna Solis, John R. Emshwiller,
& Alfredo Corchado, Changing the Rules: New Immigration Law Brings Much Anxiety
To U.S. Workplaces - Edict Against Hiring Illegals Creates Labor Shortages; Fake
Papers Proliferate - A Lure for German Cowboys, WALL ST. J., June 5, 1987, at A1
[hereinafter Changing the Rules].
6
The employers who do advocate for the rights of their immigrant employees tend to
be those closest to their workers in terms of vulnerability, as illustrated by the
collective efforts of several migrant workers and their employers to pass Ag Jobs. The
need for the “best and the brightest” that was articulated in 1965 has been reborn in
discussions of the DREAM Act. Employers of highly skilled immigrants successfully
appealed to Congress in 1965, negotiating a program that would allow them to more
easily hire skilled workers from abroad.
7
See Jordan Fabina, Transcript: Bipartisan Framework for Comprehensive
Immigration Reform, ABC NEWS, Jan. 28, 2013, available at http://www.abcnews.go.
com/ABC_Univision/News/transcript-bipartisan-framework-comprehensiveimmigration-reform/story?id=18330912#.UWtivbXBNAI (last visited Apr. 14, 2013)
(asserting that up to 11 million undocumented workers live in the shadows because of
the broken immigration system in the U.S.); see also Fact Sheet: Fixing our Broken
Immigration System so Everyone Plays by the Rules, THE WHITE HOUSE (Jan. 29,
2013), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/01/29/fact-sheet-fixing-ourbroken-immigration-system-so-everyone-plays-rules (last visited Apr. 14, 2013)
(explaining that it is time to fix the immigration system by creating a fair and effective
system that lives up to the ideals of our heritage).
8
Listing in order from most vulnerable to least: undocumented aliens, documented
workers attached to their employer (such as H-2B workers), temporary workers with a
flexible visa, Green Card holders, and citizens. See Keith Cunningham-Parmeter,
Redefining the Rights of Undocumented Workers, 58 AM. U. L. REV. 1361, 1362
(2009).
9
Empowerment can come from many sources be it unionization, an easily accessible
private right of action, the ability to “vote with your feet” by easily moving between
employers, or a choice in employment from either variety or fiscal stability.
10
See Cunningham-Parmeter, supra note 8, at 1363 (citing Hoffman Plastic
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immigrants also create a labor pool on which employers can draw to defeat
union leverage tactics, such as striking, leaving the unions in a much
weaker bargaining position.11 As a result, unions often argue that an
increase in immigrant labor will leave local workers unable to compete for
jobs.12 This fear is illustrated by the fact that the law governing
union/employer relations, the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”),
only grants rights to “employees;” a term which excludes labor fields in
which temporary labor is commonly needed.13 These exclusions, however,
make certain immigrant groups even more vulnerable than they would be if
they had full protections under the NLRA, making them the best bargain
for an unscrupulous businessman and the greatest threat perceived by
unions.14 Some employers have even used the immigration system to avoid

Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 151 (2002)). Some employers have
demonstrated their preference for more vulnerable employees by refusing to assist
those eligible for amnesty when Congress passed the IRCA by helping these employees
prove their history of employment. See Changing the Rules, supra note 5, at A3.
11
Labor unions have historically viewed immigrant laborers as an economic threat,
since they are often willing to work under conditions that are less safe and for lower
wages than those acceptable to unionized employees, creating a disincentive for
employers to invest in safer working conditions for more permanent laborers. See
Lorraine Schmall, The Evolving Definition of the Immigrant Worker: The Intersection
Between Employment, Labor, and Human Rights Law: Article: ICE Effects: Federal
Worksite Non-Enforcement of U.S. Immigration Laws, 44 U.S.F. L. REV. 373, 376
(2009).
12
See Letter to the President: Executive Authority to grant administrative relief for
DREAM Act beneficiaries, NILC, 7 (May 28, 2012), available at http://www.
.nilc.org/document.html?id=754 (last visited Apr. 14, 2013) (explaining that there is
executive authority for many forms of administrative relief for beneficiaries of the
DREAM Act) [hereinafter NILC].
13
The NLRA defines non-employees as those working in agriculture, domestic
service, family employees, independent contractors, supervisors, or employees under
the Railway Labor Act. African Americans and other vulnerable groups have
historically held these jobs which are now most commonly held by immigrants. See
Christopher David Ruiz Cameron, The Borders of Collective Representation:
Comparing the Rights of Undocumented Workers to Organize Under United States and
International Labor Standards, 44 U.S.F. L. REV. 431 (2009) (citing NLRA, § 2(3); 29
U.S.C. § 152(3) (2006)).
14
This is a very simplified summary of a complicated political issue; scrupulous
employers, while wanting to keep labor costs low, also want to obey the law and ensure
their employees are safe but cannot compete with other manufacturers who are willing
to cut costs by illegally hiring undocumented workers. Additionally, the nature of some
work, such as agriculture, means that many employers cannot find Americans willing
to do the work for a wage the employer can reasonably pay and so are dependent on
immigrant labor. See Immigration: Hearing before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary,
88th Cong. (1964); Periodicvideos, Immigrant Farm Workers, C-SPAN (Sep. 24, 2010),
available at http://www.c-spanvideo.org/ program/295639-1; Interview by Michel
Martin with Arturo Rodriguez, President, United Farm Workers (July 7, 2010),
available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId= 128358334.
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paying undocumented workers or repress unionization efforts by reporting
the workers to immigration officials.15 On the other hand, scrupulous
employers tend to advocate for an increase in lawful labor immigration to
allow them to compete with unscrupulous employers.16 Since lawful status
reduces an employee’s vulnerability, employers who advocate for increased
status are valuable allies for pro-rights reformers.17
Common rhetoric used by employers to advocate for increased
immigration across the centuries sounds very familiar today; workers in the
United States are not willing to do the kind of labor that immigrants will
do; increasing wages to induce Americans to work these jobs will harm the
bottom line, putting employers out of business; immigrants are hard
workers who benefit the economy by providing a base of affordable labor.18

15

See NILC, supra note 12, at 3; see also Flores v. Albertson's, Inc., 2004 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 29082, at *1 (C.D. Cal. June 4, 2004) (finding that the employer misclassified
janitorial staff as “contractors” to avoid California’s wage-and-hours laws).
16
See Phil Glaize, Testimony: Protecting America’s Harvest before the House
Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Immigration, Refugees, and Border
Security, at 3 (Sep. 24, 2010) available at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/
pdf/Glaize100924.pdf. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”), the agency
tasked with investigation and deportation of undocumented immigrants, and the
Department of Labor (“DOL”) have committed to working together to prevent
employers from using immigration enforcement to thwart labor enforcement because it
is “essential to ensure proper wages and working conditions for all covered workers
regardless of immigration status . . . to protect the employment rights of lawful U.S.
workers, whether citizen or non-citizen, and to reduce the incentive for illegal
migration to the United States.” REVISED MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN
THE DEPARTMENTS OF HOMELAND SECURITY AND LABOR CONCERNING ENFORCEMENT
ACTIVITIES AT WORKSITES (Mar. 31, 2011), available at http://www.dol.gov/
asp/media/reports/DHS-DOL-MOU.pdf.
17
Perhaps the most well-known example of employers using immigration laws to
subvert labor protections is the Supreme Court’s ruling in Hoffman Plastics. See
Hoffman Plastic Compounds v. NLRB, 122 S. Ct. 1275 (2002) (finding that the NLRB
had over-stepped its authority in awarding back-pay to an undocumented worker who
had been fired for engaging in union activities, since it would require the employer to
violate IRCA by paying an unauthorized worker). After Hoffman, employers who
discriminated against undocumented workers would be immune from the NLRA’s
most effective enforcement measure: back-pay for hours not worked because of the
violation, because doing so would require the employer to break immigration law. This
decision drastically increased the vulnerability of undocumented workers to
discrimination and mistreatment on the job. Despite the efforts of DHS and DOL to
avoid enabling employers to use the immigrations laws to subvert employment laws,
many immigration raids have been conducted on businesses facing either formal or
informal labor disputes. Michael J. Wishnie, Emerging Issues for Undocumented
Workers, 6 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 467, 391-93 (2004). Though improved in recent
years, ICE’s policy of declining to penalize employers who participate in the raids by
self-reporting severely undermines enforcement of labor laws. See Emerging Issues for
Undocumented Workers, supra note 17, at 393.
18
See Changing the Rules, supra note 5.
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Regardless of the empirical truth of these arguments, they are very
effective in shaping laws and influencing enforcement. For example, the
argument that higher paid (and, therefore, less vulnerable workers) will
raise prices and impact an employers’ bottom line is as old as time. 19
Indeed, employers have historically favored increased immigration, which
allows them to lower production and labor costs without fear of retaliation
from a unified or otherwise empowered work force.20
Although some groups of employers would like to see an increase in
undocumented immigration, giving them a larger pool of the most
vulnerable workers, those employers are not likely to publicly advocate for
illegal immigration.21 As a result, “immigration” has become a code word
for undocumented immigrants, in addition to its use to describe temporary
workers, students, refugees, and any other non-citizen present in the United
States. With everyone using the same word, it can be difficult to
differentiate between the goals different factions are trying to accomplish.
This paper will therefore focus on the different degrees of vulnerability
created by particular courses of action, rather than the language used to
describe it.
This Note will discuss the movements that restrictionist movements
later responded to, starting with the Burlingame Treaty.22 This Note will
also explore the next wave of immigration demand came which came
during the labor shortages of World War II and the birth of the Bracero
Program.23 The 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”)24 was
inspired by a shift in priorities for the kinds of immigrants American
industry needed.25 The passage of the Immigration Reform and Control Act

19

Daniel Cleveland, Letter to J. Ross Browne: United States Minister to China, in
FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES: 1865-1869 531 (1868).
20
See Schmall, supra note 11, at 376.
21
Employers use tactics such as threats of deportation to keep wages unlawfully low,
and so cut overhead costs. Emerging Issues for Undocumented Workers, supra note 17,
at 389.
22
The Burlingame Treaty was inspired by cross-country expansion, the
Intercontinental railroad, and California’s gold mines. See John Higham, The Politics
of Immigration Restriction, 1 IMMIGR. & NAT’LITY L. REV. 1, 4 (1977) (noting that the
Burlingame Treaty, in an effort to establish profitable trading opportunities in Asia,
included groundbreaking measures that allowed Chinese citizens the right to free
immigration and travel within the United States).
23
Wayne D. Rasmussen, A History of The Emergency Farm Labor Supply Program
1943-47, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., BUREAU OF ARGRIC. ECON. (Sep. 1951) (exploring the
Emergency Farm Labor Supply Program, also known as the Bracero Program, to
provide for the temporary importation of workers from Mexico to Aid the American
agricultural economy during a shortage of far labor workers during World War II).
24
The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236 (1965)
(replacing the national origins quota with a preference system that focused, instead, on
immigrants’ skills and family relationships with United States citizens and residents).
25
The influence of McCarthyism, nationalism, and re-structured racism on the 1952
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(“IRCA”)26 in the 1980’s shows the influence of employers on legislation
intended to regulate their practices. Finally, this Note will look forward to
what combination of economic conditions and employer influence could
spur another wave of legal admissions, allowing passage of the DREAM
and Agricultural Opportunities and Securities (“Ag Jobs”) Acts as part of
Comprehensive Immigration Reform.27
II. THE PAST: REGULATION IS BORN
Businesses depend on cost-effective labor for economic success, which
often translates to a dependence on immigrant or other vulnerable
workers.28 Prior to 1864, America’s cheap labor came largely from
legalized slavery, but in free states and after passage of the 13th
Amendment, American industry turned to the importation of voluntary
labor.29 After the Louisiana Purchase, America needed far more residents
than mere procreation could supply, and business needed more workers
than there were available locally.30 Employers turned to China to find this
massive force of vulnerable workers, who were only made more vulnerable
by the Burlingame Treaty. This wave of admission into the United States
gave way to restrictionist policies inundated with vitriolic rhetoric
beginning with the Chinese Exclusion Acts and continuing on to the racebased quotas of the 1920s.31 This section will examine what came before
that firestorm. What fueled the admission of immigrants to our Eastern and
Western shores?
INA and the 1964 Civil Rights movement are beyond the scope of this paper.
26
Immigration Reform and Control Act, Pub. L. No. 99-603 (1986) (requiring
employers to attest to the immigration status of their employees, making it a crime to
knowingly hire or recruit unauthorized immigrants, and legalizing seasonal
agricultural, illegal worker).
27
The Development, Relief, and Education for Alien Minors Act, S. 1291 (Aug. 1,
2001) (providing conditional, permanent residency to immigrants of “good moral
character” who arrived in the United States as minors, lived in the country
continuously, and graduated from U.S. high schools).
28
See House Committee Judiciary on Immigration, Citizenship, Refugees, Border
Security & International Law, Immigrant Farm Workers, at 02:00-02:46, (Sep. 24,
2010), available at http://www.c-spanvideo.org/program/295639-1 [hereinafter
Immigrant Farm Workers].
29
See Michael J. Wishnie, Proportionality: The Struggle for Balance in U.S.
Immigration Policy, 72 U. PITT. L. REV. 431, 436 (2011).
30
See HYUNG-CHAN KIM, A LEGAL HISTORY OF ASIAN AMERICANS, 1790-1990 45
(1994). This need lives on in modern immigration law, allowing temporary
employment visas where an employer can show that the necessary workers must be
imported. See U.S.C. 1101 §§ H(2)(a), H(2)(b), H(1)(b).
31
The Chinese Exclusion Act, 22 Stat, 61 (1882); see, e.g., Higham, supra note 22,
at 6-15 (stating that race-based quotas were inspired by a fear that Chinese and other
“minority” populations were expanding more quickly than the preferred Western
European immigrants).
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A. Chinese Labor and the Burlingame Treaty
Across the history of United States immigration law, industry has
hungered for better, faster, and cheaper labor.32 Perhaps the earliest
rumblings that turned into voluntary immigration came from the California
gold-rush and the transcontinental railroad in the mid-1800s.33 At the same
time as American industries were rapidly expanding across the continent, a
population boom in a region of China that had a tradition of migration
provided the supply of labor.34 The discovery of gold in California
provided work for the Chinese immigrants, recruited by Hawaiian sugar
plantations and desiring to move on to other work after their contract was
complete.35 By the onset of the Civil War, a pro-immigration front was
sweeping a nation that was expanding faster economically than by
population.36 Although the voice of restrictionists gained momentum in the
1850s, the onset of the Civil War diminished most opposition to
immigration.37
Employers in the mining and railroad industries were able to use a
contract labor system to both encourage Chinese immigration and to
increase their own profits.38 Employers sent recruiters to China, who would
make false promises of return passage to entice laborers to make the
journey across the Pacific and would negotiate terms which were far lower
32

See Cleveland, supra note 19, at 531.
See Higham, supra note 22, at 4-6. Both of these economic draws for immigration
and internal migration led to a determination by some American labor groups that the
Chinese laborers were an “invading hoard” that threatened their chances of success on
the West Coast. See Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 595-96 (1889)
(asserting that the Chinese provided a valuable service when they migrated to the U.S.
and began working as domestic and outdoor workers).
34
See Kim, supra note 30, at 47.
35
LUCY E. SALYER, LAWS HARSH AS TIGERS: CHINESE IMMIGRANTS AND THE
SHAPING OF MODERN IMMIGRATION LAW 125 (1995).
36
See Kim, supra note 30, at 52. In 1864, President Lincoln prompted Congress to
pass a law that would bring in more cheap labor from abroad since the end of the Civil
War and slavery left the economy in a state of transition. When he asked Congress to
pass the “Coolie Trade Law” in 1862, he had observed that the practices of transporting
Chinese from America to another port in the Americas bore significant resemblance to
the practices used in transporting slaves from Africa. Id. at 49-50 (citing Executive
Document No. 16, House of Representatives, 2d Sess., Thirty-Seventh Cong., 17); see
also Cleveland, supra note 19, at 533, 541.
37
COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SYSTEMS OF
THE UNITED STATES, 80th Cong. 1st Sess., at 49 (1950).
38
The system allowed employers to contract with laborers to work at below-market
wages for a fixed period of time, after which they would be free to seek other
employment. See Douglas Clouatre, Contract Labor System, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
IMMIGRATION (Sep. 27, 2011), available at http://immigration-online.org/448-contractlabor-system.html (last visited Apr. 14, 2013).
33
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than what workers in America would accept.39 This forced non-contract
laborers to lower their own requested wages to compete, greatly improving
business profits.40 Congress acknowledge the importance of cheap foreign
labor to the expanding United States economy when it authorized
employers to bind the services of immigrants for whom they had paid
passage through passage of the Immigration Act of 1864.41 Even President
Abraham Lincoln supported this legislation as a means to address the labor
shortage facing the country in the wake of the Civil War.42 Additionally, in
1864, Congress passed a law not only to encourage immigration but to
improve travel conditions for those immigrants.43 It also protected
employers by making the contracts under which foreign laborers promised
to repay their way to the United States enforceable under United States law,
thereby legalizing debt bondage of the Chinese.44 The goal was to make it
easier for employers, who were feeling the lack of labor lost during the
Civil War, to get a return on their investments abroad.45
In 1868, the United States and China entered into the Burlingame
Treaty, which allowed massive immigration of Chinese laborers to enter
the United States.46 This move was largely supported by the companies
involved in building the transcontinental railroad, as there were not enough
American workers willing and able to perform the necessary labor.47 After
the passage of the Burlingame Treaty, in 1869, employers began
advertising in China and other countries for employment.48 Several
39

Joyce Kuo, Excluded, Segregated and Forgotten: A Historical View of the
Discrimination of Chinese Americans in Public Schools, 5 ASIAN L. J. 181, 184 (1998)
(finding Chinese immigrants were laborers desired for their manpower during the
expansion of the United States, specifically the construction of the transcontinental
railroad, but were targets of resentment and violence during recessions).
40
See, e.g., Higham, supra note 22, at 4 (noting that tensions between laborers did
not take hold until laborers could no longer easily become employers, thus creating
more concrete classes and threatening the opportunities for laborers to improve their
status).
41
1864 Immigration Act, ch. 246, 13 Stat. 385; Higham, supra note 22, at 5.
42
See 1864 Immigration Act, ch. 246, 13 Stat. 385.
43
COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SYSTEMS OF
THE UNITED STATES, 80th Cong. 1st Sess., at 49 (1950).
44
Id.
45
Although the law was repealed that same year, it illustrates the impact employers
had on federal approaches to immigration before the Chinese Exclusion act. See id.
46
However, the primary drive had come from American merchants eager to secure
cheap goods from China and access to the Chinese markets. See United States
Department of State Office of the Historian, The Burlingame-Seward Treaty, 1868,
available at http://history.state.gov/milestones/1866-1898/Burlingame-SewardTreaty
(last visited July 12, 2012) [hereinafter The Burlingame-Seward Treaty]; see also
Cleveland, supra note 19, at 533.
47
See Kuo, supra note 39, at 184; Clouatre, supra note 38, at 1.
48
See THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SYSTEMS OF THE UNITED STATES,
supra note 37.
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employers flooded the labor pool in the United States with cheap,
vulnerable labor, thus forcing all workers, local or foreign, to negotiate
work at lower wages.49 The rate of immigration had indeed created an
incredibly vulnerable class of laborers, so much so that “concern for the
mistreatment of immigrants” was a focus in Congressional debates on the
“involuntary servitude” clause of the Thirteenth Amendment,50 the AntiPeonage Act of 1867,51 the Civil Rights Act of 1870,52 and the Padrone Act
of 1874.53
This wave of immigrant admission was quickly tempered by a cry for
restriction.54 Many of the contract laborers did the most dangerous tasks on
the railroad,55 giving rise to fears in some American laborers that the
Chinese labor presence would lower their own wages and make their own
working conditions less safe.56 It became a widely held belief that, contract
labor or not, Chinese workers would work harder and for less wages than
other laborers.57 The Burlingame treaty, itself, made Chinese workers more
vulnerable by requiring that no Chinese could ever become United States
citizens and, therefore, would never own land or be able to compete with
many employers.58 The California legislature used this provision to tax the
49

The practice of recruiting foreign labor to drive down domestic wages was the
alien contract labor law, which became effective on February 26, 885. See THE
IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SYSTEMS OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 37.
50
U.S. CONST. amend. XIII (“Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as
punishment for a crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist
within the United States . . . .”).
51
Anti-Peonage Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1994 (1867).
52
The Enforcement Act, 16 Stat. 140 (1870) (prohibiting the discrimination based on
race, color, or previous state of servitude against persons seeking to register to vote).
53
The Padrone Statute, 18 U.S.C. § 446 (1874) (“prevent[ing] the practice of
enslaving, buying, selling, or using Italian children.”); see also Proportionality, supra
note 29, at 436-37.
54
See Burlingame-Seward Treaty, 1868, supra note 46.
55
See Office of the Historian, Chinese Immigration and Chinese Exclusion Acts,
available at http://history.state.gov/milestones/1866-1898/ChineseImmigration (last
visited June 30, 2013) [hereinafter Chinese Immigration and Chinese Exclusion Acts].
56
See Clouatre, supra note 38, at 1; Kuo, supra note 39, at 184.
57
At the same time, Americans and European immigrants were travelling west to
seek their fortunes in California’s gold mines themselves. This uncontrolled flood of
newcomers from across the country and across the ocean resulted in violent clashes
when the miners saw their increased competition for the limited supply of gold. See
Kim, supra note 30, at 47; Cleveland, supra note 19, at 533, 540; see also Chinese
Immigration and Chinese Exclusion Acts, supra note 55.
58
“Citizens of the United States visiting or residing in China shall enjoy the same
privileges, immunities, or exemptions in respect to travel or residence as may there be
enjoyed by the citizens or subjects of the most favored nation. And, reciprocally,
Chinese subjects visiting or residing in the United States shall enjoy the same
privileges, immunities, and exemptions in respect to travel or residence, as may there
be enjoyed by the citizens or subjects of the most favored nation. But nothing herein
contained shall be held to confer naturalization upon citizens of the United States in
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Chinese without violating the United States Constitution by imposing taxes
and land ownership laws based on eligibility for citizenship, rather than
national origin or other constitutionally protected class.59 Unable to
compete with business that required land ownership, Chinese laborers were
stuck working for others and paying higher taxes.
The Chinese workers were not completely powerless, however,
especially when they could convince their employers to join in protests
against discriminatory legislation. One such example is when both Chinese
workers and their employers abandoned the mines in response to the
incredibly high 1855 foreign miner’s tax, which caused the revenues in
mining counties to be cut by half.60 The California legislature quickly
repealed the tax, however, when employers objected that it was harming
their profits, depriving them of the cheap labor on which they had come to
rely.61 The importance of immigration to employers is further illustrated by
the fact that, despite the violence and discrimination against the Chinese in
the latter half of the 19th century, immigration continued largely
unabated.62 The vitriol of the restrictionist movement was tempered by the
voices of businessmen who wanted the cheap Chinese labor and goods.63
Furthermore, the Senate repealed every restrictionist law in California that
the Supreme Court did not declare unconstitutional when businesses
objected to the laws’ economic impact.64 Writing at the height of this
tension, a San Francisco lawyer noted that the “sudden removal [of all
Chinese] would . . . paralyze many branches of industry . . . depriving them
of the cheap labor by which they are sustained.”65
China, nor upon the subjects of China in the United States.” See John Hayakawa Torok,
Reconstruction and Racial Nativism: Chinese Immigrants and the Debate on the
Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments and Civil Rights Laws, 3 ASIAN L.J.
55, 55 n. 77 (1996) (citing Burlingame Treaty art. VI, 16 Stat. 739, 740 (1868)).
59
The miners also turned to violence, throwing Chinese miners out of mining camps
in mob actions, and creating anti-Chinese riots. See Kim, supra note 30, at 47. It
became common practice among employers to encourage hostilities and divisiveness
along racial lines to thwart unionization attempts. See Salyer, supra note 35, at 122 n. 3
(citing John Higham’s detailed work which paralleled the waves of antiforeigner
sentiments and economic recessions).
60
Cleveland, supra note 19, at 531.
61
The monthly tax, being very steep, was repealed after one year when Chinese
mining camps were depopulated and tax collectors were thrown out. In 1856, Congress
reduced the license to fifteen percent of the price and remained in place until ruled
unconstitutional in 1870. The monthly license fee became fifty percent of California’s
income from all sources, providing some incentive for the government to maintain
Chinese immigration. See Kim, supra note 30, at 47-48; see also Cleveland, supra note
19, at 533.
62
Torok, supra note 58, at 64.
63
See Cleveland, supra note 19, at 535.
64
See id. at 533-34.
65
The same lawyer also mentioned that one quarter of the state’s revenue came from
the Chinese immigrants. See Cleveland, supra note 19, at 531.
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With the completion of the Transcontinental Railroad in 1869, the
demand for cheap Chinese labor waned and hostilities towards the now
unemployed Chinese labor pool increased.66 At the same time, Chinese
laborers had begun realizing the American dream, earning enough as
laborers to become business owners themselves and muting the voices of
their former employers against restriction.67 Efforts to eliminate, or
severely restrict, immigration of Chinese laborers stood in direct conflict
with the Burlingame Treaty, which brought the discussion of immigration
out of California’s legislature and into the national spotlight.68
With employers no longer in need of new immigrants, the political
scales began to tip away from immigration and especially away from
Chinese immigration.69 The nation’s two main railroads both declared
bankruptcy in the 1870s, leading to a nationwide recession.70 The Panic of
1873 and another recession in 1893 unsettled the major employers of
immigrant labor: gold mines and railroads.71 With business owners no
longer invested in immigration, congressmen from border-states and
special interest groups prompted President Hayes to re-negotiate the treaty,
which included a concession by China that the United States had the right
to restrict immigration into its territories.72 Although the railroads had
recovered by 1882, congressmen elected during the Panic were still in

66

By 1876, both Republican and Democratic politicians had adopted anti-Chinese
talking points, and Congress approved the formation of a Special Committee on
Chinese Immigration of the State of California to issue a report. The report, entitled
“Chinese Immigration: Its Social, Moral, and Political Effect” was proposed and
drafted by congressmen who also pushed for the creation of the Committee, and
conducted the hearings in California. It characterized the Chinese as undesirable
people, accused Chinese women of corrupting American youth, and requested that the
President re-negotiate the Burlingame treaty. See Kim, supra note 30, at 58-59; see also
Kuo, supra note 39, at 184 (citing VICTOR LOW, THE UNIMPRESSIBLE RACE 27 (1982)).
67
See Cleveland, supra note 19, at 542.
68
President Hayes vetoed a bill passed by Congress in 1879 attempting to limit the
number of Chinese allowed on U.S.-bound ships to 15 passengers. See Kim, supra note
30, at 59-60.
69
By 1870, the anti-Chinese movement had reached the Eastern Seaboard’s press,
with newspapers in Massachusetts calling for complete Chinese exclusion when
Chinese began to appear in that state. See Kim, supra note 30, at 41 (citing STUART
CREIGHTON MILLER, UNWELCOME IMMIGRANT: AMERICAN IMAGE OF THE CHINESE,
1785-1882” (1969)).
70
James M. Swank, The Great Cleveland Panic of 1893, in PHILADELPHIA:
AMERICAN IRON AND STEEL ASSOCIATION, TARIFF TRACT NO. 4, 3 (1896).
71
Id.
72
Hayes dispatched the Agnell Commission to China in an attempt to meet the
demands of restrictionist groups, but still maintain good relations with China by
amending the Burlingame Treaty. See Kim, supra note 30, at 59-60; American
Experience, Rutherford B. Hayes: 19th President, PBS, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/
Americanexperience/features/biography/presidents-hayes/ (last visited Oct. 25, 2013).
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office on a platform that appealed to restrictionist fervor.73 The Chinese
Exclusion Act of 1882,74 restricting immigration of Chinese laborers for ten
years,75 was considered lenient enough to both comply with the modified
Burlingame Treaty and to address the fears of a nation verging on
depression.76 The power of the railroads at the negotiating table, however,
may be seen in the provision of the Chinese Exclusion Act allowing
laborers, currently present in the United States, to remain rather than
requiring all Chinese laborers to be removed.77
B. California Post-China
Exclusionist sentiments did not stop with Chinese immigration; soon,
all immigrants,78 particularly those from the “Asiatic zone,” were facing the
same hostilities encountered by Chinese laborers.79 Like Chinese miners,
American landowners initially welcomed Japanese farm laborers because
of their willingness to work for low wages under harsh conditions.
However, once that much-lauded work ethic led to Japanese landownership and direct competition with American farmers, the welcome of
the Japanese immigrants was significantly chilled.80 Nativist fears grew as
Japanese wives began joining their husbands and, unlike the Chinese,
having children who were United States citizens and who could then own
land.81 Facing restrictionist pressures,82 President Roosevelt entered into a
73

See Swank, supra note 70, at 3.
The Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, 8 U.S.C. § 261 (1882) (prohibiting the
immigration of Chinese laborers until its repeal by the Magnuson Act in 1943).
75
President Arthur vetoed the Chinese Exclusion Act, which sought a twenty year
exclusion of Chinese laborers in 1882, due to its conflicts with the Burlingame Treaty.
However, at his urging, Congress submitted a revised bill, which would only limit
immigration for ten years. See Kim, supra note 30, at 59-60.
76
See Kim, supra note 30, at 59 (noting that a nation-wide depression from 18931897 prompted violence against immigrants in all sectors, originating from all
countries); see also Salyer, supra note 35, at 122.
77
The Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, 8 U.S.C. § 261 (1882).
78
When stating “all immigrants,” this does not include immigrants from Mexico and
Canada. See OSCAR M. TRELLES AND JAMES F. BAILEY, IMMIGRATION NATIONALITY
ACTS: LEGISLATIVE HISTORIES AND RELATED, 1950-1978 43 (1979).
79
See Salyer, supra note 35, at 126-27 (claiming that Indians were “taking the jobs
of (whites) who are part of the real population of the country”).
80
See Salyer, supra note 35, at 126-27.
81
The Japanese population increased by 100,000 from 1900 to 1908. See Victoria
Erhart, Asiatic Exclusion League, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF IMMIGRATION (June 21, 2011),
available at http://immigration-online.org/363-asiatic-exclusion-league.html (last
visited June 25, 2013); Kim, supra note 30, at 101; U.S. Dep’t of State Office of the
Historian, Japanese-American Relations at the Turn of the Century, 1900-1922,
available at http://history.state.gov/milestones/1899-1913/JapaneseRelations (last
visited June 12, 2013).
82
In 1906, the fearful fervor was felt when the Asiatic Exclusion League convinced
74
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“Gentleman’s Agreement” with Japan, whereby the United States would
accept Japanese immigrants, so long as Japan promised not to send any
laborers.83 This agreement fell apart when laborers from Japan continued to
arrive, and the United States economy began to experience the Great
Depression.84
The United States Chamber of Commerce objected to the more extreme
demands of the restrictionist movement, arguing that outright prohibition or
even severe restriction of immigration would starve the country of muchneeded labor.85 Other employer organizations lamented the loss of labor
created by the 1921 restrictions, claiming that even the tiny quotas were not
being met and women and children were replacing skilled laborers.86
Prior to the Chinese Exclusion, the arguments invoked by employers
that kept labor restrictions at bay were largely based on the inadequacy of
the United States workforce to meet the needs of a rapidly expanding

San Francisco to segregate Chinese, Japanese, and Korean schoolchildren, violating an
1895 U.S. treaty with Japan. Japan was able to combat the exclusionist forces longer
than China, not because of employer influence but because of military might. The only
thing more powerful than the politics advocating exclusion, it seems, was Japan’s
military, which had just defeated Russia and was making the United States nervous.
See Erhart, supra note 81, at 1.
83
Although San Francisco also excluded children from Korea and China from its
public schools, only Japan had the bargaining power to negotiate a different
arrangement for its citizens in the United States. Japan had recently defeated Russia, in
1905, and paranoia that Japan was planning to invade the United States was pervasive
in California. See Salyer, supra note 35, at 127. The agreement was designed to
preserve Japanese dignity in U.S. immigration laws and to allow the government of the
United States to assuage the fears of its citizens about a hostile racial take-over. It
required the United States to accept all Japanese citizens who had been issued a
passport by the Japanese government, so long as Japan would only issue passports to
“non-laborers or returning laborers, residents, or settled agriculturalists.” See Kim,
supra note 30, at 102; see also Salyer, supra note 35, at 128.
84
The Asiatic Exclusion League relied on the concept of wage preservation and drew
on the fears of an “immigrant hoard” that had successfully excluded the Chinese
eighteen years earlier. See Erhart, supra note 81; see also Salyer, supra note 35, at 128
(noting that the League increased pressure on the government once it became apparent
that the Gentleman’s Agreement did not prevent Japanese women, married to Japanese
laborers by proxy, from entering the U.S.). This practice created the proliferation of
Japanese families in United States would lead to more native-born Japanese who
qualified for American Citizenship. Japanese Immigration: U.S. Chamber of
Commerce Considers Placing Country on European, WALL ST. J., July 27, 1931, at 2.
85
The Chamber also argued that immigration to the U.S. tended to increase
commerce with the country of origin and that immigration was vital to the success of
American investments abroad. See Immigration and Commerce, WALL ST. J., Jan. 16,
1907, at A1; see also Industrial Relations: Employers’ Associations in the United
States, 8 Int’l Lab. L. Rev. 367, 377 (1923).
86
Immigration Problem Affecting Industry: Cut in Supply of Skilled Labor by Quota,
WALL ST. J. Oct. 25, 1922, at 4.

2013]

IMMIGRATION AND THE VULNERABLE WORKER

535

industry.87 Although, at the time, there were local workers willing and able
to do the hard agricultural, railroad, and mining work available, the
country’s population simply was not able to support the nation’s rapid
economic growth.88 After World War I, the United States economy had
become accustomed to “the abnormal[ly high] wage levels of war
industry,” which could only be maintained with the employment of
vulnerable immigrant labor.89 Post-World War I, industry underwent
numerous changes in the United States, including the movement of local
laborers into the higher paid positions for which they had been trained
during the way, causing many employers to decry their new dependency on
the few remaining, unskilled laborers.90 Even after the 1921 Act was
passed, employers continued to fight for expansionist reform, notifying
Congress that labor-intensive industries, such as agriculture, construction,
manufacturing, and transportation, would “suffer irreparable injury”
without admission of immigrants.91 Unfortunately for employers and
immigrants, the World War I had left the nation unwilling to embroil itself
in Europe’s turmoil by leaving the gates open to immigration.92
Despite the federal government’s fears of European involvement,
employers in labor-intensive industries were advantaged by the fact that,
prior to the Chinese Exclusion Act, immigration issues were generally
deemed to be within the purview of the individual states. The few instances
of federal involvement pre-World War I appeared to encourage
immigration as a boon to society: for example, the 1864 immigration act
subtitled” an act to encourage immigration” and the elimination of head
taxes as unconstitutional.93 Indeed, despite the clamoring of restrictionists

87

See Cleveland, supra note 19, at 540.
See Susan B. Carter and Richard Sutch, Historial Perspectives on the Economic
Consequences of Immigration into the United States, in THE HANDBOOK OF
INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION: THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 325 (Charles Hirschman,
Philip Kasinitz, & Josh DeWind eds. 1999) [hereinafter Carter and Sutch].
89
Immigration Embargo, WALL ST. J., FEB. 22, 1919, at 1.
90
Immigration Problems to Come Up Soon: Government Will Endeavor to Form Its
Policy, WALL STREET J., Jan 15, 1919, at 7 [hereinafter Immigration Problems to Come
Up Soon].
91
Immigration Problems to Come Up Soon, supra note 90; Urges Selective
Immigration: President Grace of Bethlehem Steel Thinks It Best Solution, WALL ST. J.,
May 19, 1923, at 1.
92
“After the First World War, the legislative power of the United States felt that it
was indispensable for the protection and welfare of the Nation to restrict immigration
to this country.” Statement of the Committee for the Increase of the Spanish
Immigration Quota in the United States, House Hearings 1965 at 431 (statement of
Jose Castro, Public Relations Secretary, Committee for the Increase of the Spanish
Immigration Quota in the United States).
93
Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Company, 157 U.S. 429 (1895), aff'd on reh'g,
158 U.S. 601 (1895) (holding poll taxes to be unconstitutional); 1864 Immigration Act
Sess. 1, Chap. 246, 13 Stat. 385, 38th Congress.
88
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against the economic impact of immigrants, nineteenth century employers
were able to foster an incredible influx of vulnerable workers.94 However,
restrictionists began to gain power by the 1920s, and congressmen began to
propose immigration restrictions, selling the idea to employers as an effort
to ensure that “men could be brought in when needed and kept out when
not.”95 The Great Depression, however, quickly silenced the debate over
restrictionist measures, as both industry and immigration were stunted.96 To
combat the growing unemployment rate in the United States, President
Hoover began reducing immigration in 1930.97 The high unemployment
rate led to a surplus of local labor available for the labor-intensive
industries. Yet even during this time of general surplus in local labor, the
Federal Farm Board asked the House of Representatives to slow
restrictions on Mexican labor, since “[i]n the Southwest, where small
vegetable crops are grown, American labor cannot stand the work because
of the stooping, bending, and crawling involved.”98 This request did not
have much impact, however, as immigration ultimately declined as the
Depression progressed.99
C. The Bracero Program
When the United States entered World War II, it experienced the twin
economic problems of a booming industry and a rapidly depleting
workforce.100 Congress established the War Manpower Commission to
allocate the country’s labor between agriculture, munitions, and skilled
labor, while also accounting for the 400,000 members of the workforce
drafted into selected service each month.101 Even when all those who had
been unemployed during the Great Depression were placed in these newly
created jobs, the war-powered industry needed even more labor.102 The
94

See Cleveland, supra note 19, at 536.
Immigration Regulation: Congressman Johnson Seeks to Have Men Admitted
When Needed, WALL ST. J., Oct. 5, 1923, at 3.
96
See Immigration no More a Menace to Labor: Fewer Admitted Than in Any Time
in Past, WALL ST. J., Dec. 10, 1931, at 15; see also Immigration Total at Civil War
Level: Aggregate of 97,139 Aliens Admitted to United States, WALL ST. J., Aug. 5,
1931, at 11.
97
Immigration Laws: President Hoover Gets Report on Tightening of Restrictions,
WALL ST. J., Sep. 10, 1930, at 3.
98
Mexican Labor Immigration, WALL ST. J. Feb.11, 1930, at 3.
99
Immigration Up Slightly, WALL ST. J., May 2, 1932, at 5; Immigration Falls: Both
Quota and Non-Quota Totals Off Sharply from Previous Year, WALL ST. J. Dec 22,
1932, at 9.
100
Julia Henderson, Foreign Labour in the United States during the War, 52 INT’L
LAB. L. REV. 609, 609-10 (1945).
101
See SAMUEL ROSENMAN, 1942: PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D.
ROOSEVELT: 44 WAR MANPOWER COMMISSION 209 (1950).
102
See id.
95
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United States then turned to its neighbors who were facing high
unemployment rates and entered into treaties designed to bring workers
temporarily to the United States.103 One such program was the Bracero
Program which sought to bring labor to the United States from other
countries through treaties, rather than domestic legislation.104 The United
States negotiated these treaties with the concerns of the labor movement, as
well as concern for the general well-being of the workers, in mind.105 These
treaties required employers to pay for travel expenses, bond for the safe
return of all workers, and provide housing, food, and medical care to
agricultural workers.106 Over 400,000 citizens of Mexico, the British West
Indies, and Honduras worked for United States railroads, industrial plants,
and agricultural enterprises.107
Despite the treaties the United States entered into during the 1930s, the
decades of isolation and labor union influence in the United States were
hard to overcome. The National Management-Labor Policy Committee,
which included representatives of railroad and agricultural interests, might
have possessed the power to determine where immigrant labor should be
placed, but the Commission would not certify a need for foreign labor
without the approval of the labor unions.108 Unions, such as the United
Auto Workers (“UAW”), resisted the importation of labor, claiming it
would be unnecessary if the federal government and employers would
remedy wages, hours, and working conditions, thus encouraging more
Americans to take the available jobs.109 The UAW was able to prevent the
103

Mexico Non-Agricultural Workers, 57 STAT. 1353-57 (1943) (delineating remarks
made by the Mexican ambassador in an agreement between the United States and
Mexico regarding the recruitment of non-agricultural, Mexican workers
104
Admission of Mexican Farm Labor Authorized (Sep. 15, 1942), 5.
105
“The clauses in the international agreements guaranteeing that these workers
would not be used to displace other workers or for the purpose of reducing rates of pay
previously established were a signal victory for the organised labour [sic] movement.”
Henderson, supra note 100, at 617.
106
Mexico Non-Agricultural Workers, 57 Stat. 1353-57 (1943) (recording the
remarks of the American Ambassador to the Mexican Minister of Foreign Affairs); The
Bracero Program, Pub. L. No. 78, 65 STAT. 119 (Aug. 4, 1942), available at
library.uwb.edu/guides/usimmigration/1951_public_law_78.html; Exec. Order No.
8802, 3 C.F.R. 957, (1941).
107
“These industries all fell within the mandate given to the War Manpower
Commission by the Congress to import natives of the Western Hemisphere for "waressential" industries only.” Henderson, supra note 100, at 611, n.1.
108
See Henderson, supra note 100, at 617.
109
“The United Automobile Workers, which has maintained a solid front against the
importation of foreign workers to the forges and foundries in Michigan, in 1944
resolved that: The cost of importing workers from other countries, the creating of
housing facilities for them and the cost of transporting them back to their native
countries after the war could more logically and more fairly be applied to raising
existing wage standards in the foundries and thus attracting American workers.”
Henderson, supra note 100, at 618.
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importation of labor into their industry during WWII, but not all unions had
the same success.110 Agriculture appears to be the industry that carried the
most weight on the employer side of this debate, since the first and last
international agreements in place during WWII provided for the
importation of agricultural workers.111
Toward the end of the war, as the demand for foreign laborers
decreased, Congress began repatriating the workers, and by 1945, all but
the agricultural workers had been removed from within the United States’
borders.112 By this time, it had become apparent that the labor system in
place was not equipped to enforce the lofty protections of both the United
States and foreign workers that the federal government stipulated to in the
various treaties entered into during World War II.113 Nevertheless, the
agricultural industry still managed to convince Congress that it needed
immigrant labor, and the Bracero Program survived through several
renewal agreements until 1964.114 The reach of agricultural employers was
also apparent in the 1952 Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) “Texas
Proviso,” which made “harboring” undocumented immigrants a crime but
excluded employment from the definition of “harboring.”115 Indeed, the
provision was later seen as legislative protection for the economic pull
factors that perpetuated illegal immigration of the most vulnerable
workers.116
In 1964, the Bracero Program was stopped after the plight of foreign
workers was documented before Congress, and guest worker regulations
for workers from Mexico and other countries began.117 By 1964, it became
110

Henderson, supra note 100, at 618.
The agreements were inspire by “more than a year of agitation by southwestern
agricultural interests to obtain Mexican workers to help in harvesting the record crops
of sugarbeet and citrus fruit.” Id. 611.
112
Id.at 610.
113
Contracts guaranteeing fair wages and safe conditions were not honored because
compliance reports were collected by local offices and notoriously inconsistent,
varying based on the “personal qualifications, the attitudes, and the integrity of field
personnel.” Id. at 616.
114
The program attempted to ensure that immigrants would only be used for farm
labor by limiting admission to “skilled agriculturalists,” and not mere farm labor.
TRELLES AND BAILEY, supra note 78, at 423-424.
115
Testimony of Edward Kennedy during a Senate Session, 40:00 (C-Span, Mar. 29,
2006), available at http://www.c-spanvideo.org/program/Senate Session3673&start
=2255 [hereinafter Edward Kennedy Testimony Mar. 29, 2006].
116
Peter Brownell, The Declining Enforcement of Employer Sanctions, MIGRATION
INFO. SOURCE (Sep. 2005), available at http://www.migrationinformation.
org/usfocus/display.cfm?ID=332 [The Declining Enforcement of Employer Sanctions];
see also Edward Kennedy Testimony Mar. 29, 2006, supra note 115, at 41:30.
117
See Edward Kennedy Testimony Mar. 29, 2006, supra note 115, at 40:20 (stating
that Public Law No. 78 was designed to import agricultural workers from Mexico and
expired on December 31, 1964). After December 31, 1964, former Braceros would be
able to immigrate under the INA. Raymond F. Farrell, Report on the Commissioner of
111
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apparent that despite the legislative protections for immigrant agricultural
workers, the Bracero Program was incredibly exploitative, and agricultural
employers took advantage of the vulnerable position in which Bracero
workers were placed.118 Congress, instead, enacted a new program that
ended legal immigration of seasonal agricultural workers but still allowed
employers to hire undocumented workers without fear of repercussions,
leading to a drastic increase in illegal immigration. 119
III. CURRENT LAW: THE MORE THINGS CHANGE,
THE MORE THEY STAY THE SAME
Although the 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act (INA),
spearheaded by Senator Ted Kennedy, saw the end of the Bracero Program,
the ever widening divide between United States and Mexican economic
stability and an increasingly convoluted labor system continued to supply
the cheap labor that American industry demanded.120 The 1952 INA, which
created the backbone for modern immigration law, was largely a
codification of laws already existing at that time, sprinkled with a healthy
bolstering of national security concerns.121 United States Immigration
Immigration and Naturalization, ATT’Y GEN. ANN. REP. 394, 396 (1965).
118
Under section 101(a)(15)(h) of the present act, we have allowed thousands of
Mexicans and other foreign nationals to be imported Into this country to work at
temporary farm labor. These temporary farm laborers have been exploited by American
tfarmers and their exploitation has led to a corresponding exploitation of American
workers. The harvest of shame of this country is that we should have allowed such poor
working conditions, poor wages, poor hours, poor health standards, and poor living
conditions to exist for our own citizens, let alone foreign nationals.” Shull, Leon.
Statement to the House, Committee on the Judiciary. To Amend the Immigration and
Nationality Act and for Other Purposes, Hearing, Mar. 4, 1965 (Serial 7) (accessed
Aug. 5, 2013).
119
“For the first time in a decade, the number of deportable aliens located exceeded
100,000. The 110,371 deportable aliens located by Service officers was a 27.5 percent
increase over 1964. One factor in this increase was the greater number of Mexican
nationals found in illegal status, an increase of 26.2 percent from-43,844 in 1964 to
55,349 in 1965. As in fiscal year 1964, Mexican nationals accounted for approximately
50 percent of the aliens located in illegal status.” Farrell, supra note 117, at 405-406;
see also Edward Kennedy Testimony Mar. 29, 2006, supra note 115, at 41:30.
“Because there are still very persistent efforts to import farm labor even though
Congress has expressed a desire to end this device for depressing the wages and
working conditions of our domestic farmworkers, we urge adoption of an amendment
to Public Law 414 to prohibit the importation of such workers.” Paul Jennings
Statement to the House, Committee on the Judiciary, To Amend the Immigration and
Nationality Act and for Other Purposes, Hearing, Mar. 4, 1965 (Serial 7) (accessed
Aug. 5, 2013).
120
U.S. IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION LAWS AND ISSUES” A DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY 252 (Michael LeMay & Elliot Robert Barkan, eds. 1999).
121
Kim, supra note 30, at 150.
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Reform and Control Act (“IRCA”) was an effort by Congress to remedy
the labor system, trying to meet employer needs while still discouraging
employers from circumventing the system by imposing sanctions. The
failure of the IRCA, thus, serves as a demonstration of the power of
employers and a lesson for current reformers. Today, undocumented
immigration remains high, though has reduced in recent years thanks to an
increase in border security and worksite enforcement, as well as the
lowered demands of employers in an economic recession.122
A. 1965 INA: Braceros Exchanged for Professionals
During World War II, America began making large strides in
technological advancement.123 The fields of engineering, medicine, and
technology expanded quickly, and education could not keep up.124 After the
war, America’s high tech industry began to thrive, and a new consumer for
immigrant labor was born. The 1965 INA was designed, for among other
reasons, to make it easier to bring immigrants with special skills to the
United States. 125
Discussions of immigration reform in 1965 acknowledged the
importance of the skilled professional immigrant to the success of
America’s rapidly expanding industries.126 Although blue-collar laborers
were facing high unemployment rates, Congress recognized the immediate
need for skilled workers and created the H-1B visa.127 The unions did not
have the same veto power that the United Auto Workers had during World
War II and, thus, were only able to negotiate a requirement that the
Secretary of Labor would certify the need for additional skilled
immigrants.128
122

A recent study shows that illegal immigration from Mexico has stopped and,
possibly, reversed this year. Some credit President Obama’s strict, if quiet, enforcement
of IRCA combined with the scarcity of work created by the economic downturn for the
changing trend. See Jeffrey Passel, D’Vera Cohn, & Ana Gonzalez-Barrera, Net
Migration from Mexico Falls to Zero—and Perhaps Less, PEW HISPANIC CENTER 6
(Apr. 23, 2012), available at http://www.pewhispanic.org/2012/04/23/net-migrationfrom-mexico-falls-to-zero-and-perhaps-less [hereinafter Passel, Cohn, & GonzalezBarrera].
123
See 111 Cong. Rec. S11, 24456 (Sep. 20, 1965) (statement of Sen. Fong)
[hereinafter 111 Cong. Rec. S11].
124
See id. at 24460.
125
The new law also sought to address the racism and discrimination that had been
glaringly present since the Chinese Exclusion Acts were passed, that were a “standing
affront to millions of our citizens and our friends overseas.” Ottinger, Richard L.,
Statement to the House, Committee on the Judiciary, A Bill To Amend The Immigration
and Nationality Act and For Other Purposes, Mar. 4, 1965, 417 (Serial No. 7).
126
111 Cong. Rec. S11, 24460 (statement of Sen. Fong).
127
111 Cong. Rec. S11, 24461 (statement of Sen. Fong).
128
Edward Kennedy Testimony Mar. 26, 2006, supra note 115.
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In response to concerns about high unemployment rates,129 advocates
of the 1965 law argued that highly skilled immigrants created far more jobs
then they occupied.130 Despite the overall disapproval of the unions, some
union members also came out in support of the admission of skilled
immigrants, making speeches before Congress peppered with patriotism
and the importance of immigrants to American culture.131 This move
coincided with an increase in international labor organization and a desire
to ensure that skilled workers would not be made vulnerable to employer
exploitation on arrival in the United States 132
Although preference was given to high tech workers for the H1-B
visas, five times more agricultural and other unskilled workers were
admitted into the country than skilled workers in 1964.133 This was because
these vulnerable, temporary workers were still in greater demand.
Unfortunately, these unskilled laborers also did not benefit from the
camaraderie shown for those in high tech positions. Local employees, in
fields that vulnerable, immigrant labor was rapidly dominating, petitioned
Congress to severely restrict immigration.134 With the support of the
unions, many of the provisions requested became law.135 Other voices also
129

“Since the United States is already in the position of being unable to employ all of
its citizens and is forced to engage in an antipoverty war, it would be most unwise to
aggravate that position by allowing an influx of a horde of immigrants.” United States
Day Committee, Statement to the House, Committee on the Judiciary, A Bill to Amend
the Immigration and Nationality Act and For Other Purposes, Mar. 8, 1965, 461 (Serial
No. 7).
130
See Ottinger, supra note 125, at 417.
131
Paul Jennings, president of the International Union of Electrical, Radion &
Machine Workers, AFL-CIO said that a great percentage of the workers his union
represented were “sons and daughters of Immigrants to our great country. Many others
are themselves immigrants who came here in response to the promise of freedom and
opportunity for a better life which America holds out to all the world. Whether 1st
generation, 2d, or 10th, all have made a lasting contribution to the rich culture, the
abundance, the special qualities of greatness and dynamism which we call America.”
Jennings, supra note 119, at 422.
132
High tech and nursing industries carried the day when highly skilled workers were
given first preference in the 1965 INA. See Farrell, supra note 117, at 394, 402; see
also Jennings, supra note 119, at 422. The American Nurses’ Association pushed for
review of credentials to ensure minimum professional qualifications that would
safeguard both the interests of nurses already present from having to compete with a
large, under-qualified labor pool. American Nurses’ Association, Statement to the
House, Committee on the Judiciary, To Amend the Immigration and Nationality Act
and for Other Purposes, Hearing, Mar. 4, 1965 (Serial 7) (accessed Aug. 5, 2013).
133
Farrell, supra note 117, at 396.
134
See id.; see also Jennings, supra note 119, at 423.
135
See Jennings, supra note 119, at 423 (“We seek the addition of a requirement that
the jobs be permanent-not seasonal--which are to be filled by admission of persons
with special skills In short supply; that a shortage of such skills be declared only after it
has been shown that workers are not available at the prevailing wage; and that the
responsibility for making such a finding be that of the Secretary of Labor.”).
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joined the debate, arguing against employers’ insistence that immigrants
were necessary because citizens were unwilling to perform the difficult
manual labor. Opponents of the H1-B visas argued that either the
employers or Congress should induce American workers to take back
immigrant dominated jobs by providing better working conditions and
wages.136 Indeed, although the nation’s immigration laws were more
humanitarian and provided for the admission of multitudes of skilled
immigrants, the tide of cheap labor was beginning to displace traditional
low-wage workers which resulted in cultural and political backlash.137
B. Learning from IRCA: The Importance of Employer Cooperation
IRCA was the first immigration law that focused solely on the
employment of immigrants and strove to protect all workers, whether
citizens or not.138 It was an attempt to address the problems created by
Congress turning a blind eye to employer practices that both encouraged
violations of United States’ laws and made workers infinitely more
vulnerable. The IRCA relied on three prongs for success: (1) the H-2A visa
program to allow employers to lawfully obtain temporary agricultural labor
and amnesty for some workers already present in the United States; (2)
sanctions against employers who encouraged illegal immigration by hiring
undocumented workers; and (3) the strengthening of border security to
prevent unlawful crossings.139 Non-citizens would not face sanctions for
simply working in the United States without authorization, thus attempting
to ensure that these workers would not be made more vulnerable by
IRCA.140 For the first time, United States citizens were subject to
potentially large fines for breaking immigration laws and hiring
undocumented workers, rather than the penalties being raised solely against
the immigrants themselves.141 To ensure that employers did not have an
incentive to engage in discrimination to avoid potential liability, IRCA
required employers to keep I-9 forms establishing eligibility to work in the
136

Shull, supra note 118, at 436 (“It is time we denied entrance to any temporary
farmworkers and insisted that the American farm community create standards, and if
not, accept legislated standards that would make American workers glad to work on the
American farm.”).
137
See Farrell, supra note 117, at 396; see also Jennings, supra note 119, at 423.
138
Review and Outlook: The Immigration Nightmare, WALL ST. J., Nov. 10, 1986, at
11.
139
See Ramano L. Mazzoli and Alan K. Simpson, Enacting Immigration Reform,
Again, WASH. POST, Sep. 15, 2006, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2006/09/14/ AR2006091401179.html
140
Michael J. Wishnie, Prohibiting Employment of Unauthorized Immigrants, 2007
U. CHI. LEGAL F. 193, 194 (2007) (explaining that sanctions for non-citizens under
IRCA are based on fraud or misrepresentation of documentation, but not on the actual
employment.).
141
Changing the Rules, supra note 5, at 1.
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United States for all employees, regardless of race, ethnicity, national
origin, or any other factor.142 The success of the entire system hinged on the
INS being able to effectively execute the sanctions against employers to
function as an effective deterrent. Despite the goals of IRCA to get at the
root of undocumented immigration by targeting employers, the powerful
interests of America’s job creators prevailed, particularly when paired with
clumsy handling by the enforcing agency; consequently, a law that looked
very good on paper fell completely apart.143
The Texas Proviso flooded the labor pool with people who had no
other route to jobs in the United States, while creating little disincentive for
employers to encourage this illegal behavior.144 Although an immigrant
might face deportation and criminal charges if caught crossing the border,
once he has braved these challenges, there was no provision preventing him
from accepting one of the plentiful jobs for vulnerable workers. The 1965
INA only exacerbated this problem by making undocumented workers
more vulnerable than ever before; employers could either fire
undocumented workers with impunity or even have them deported if they
tried to negotiate for better terms of employment.145
Once again, the restrictionist tide began to rise, but this time, in
addition to shaping more favorable legislation for themselves, employees
also appealed directly to their congressmen.146 In 1973, leaders from the
AFL-CIO and the National Association for the Advancement of Colored
People (“NAACP”) pushed to eliminate the Texas Proviso, which would
make the employment of undocumented immigrants illegal, effectively
raising the cost of hiring workers.147 As a result of this push, the General
Accounting Office (“GAO”) began an investigation into the effectiveness
of such a law in other countries and found that sanctions were largely
ineffective because they were either too easy to evade or not strong enough
to serve as a deterrent.148 However, after 13 years, the political chemistry in
142

Despite the non-discrimination provisions, “IRCA was widely criticized for
having created an incentive to discriminate against prospective employees who “looked
or sounded foreign,” while failing to curb illegal immigration.” Testimony of Sen.
Orrin Hatch during a Senate Session, 06:53 (C-Span May 1, 1996), available at
http://www.c-spanvideo.org/program/ SenateSession1680&start=24807
143
See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
144
See Edward Kennedy Testimony Mar. 29, 2006, supra note 115, at 42:00.
145
Prohibiting Employment of Unauthorized Immigrants, supra note 140; see also
Solis et al., supra note 140, at 391-93.
146
Interview with an immigration lawyer with over two decades experience
(interview on file with the author).
147
The Declining Enforcement of Employer Sanctions, supra note 116.
148
“In 1982, the GAO responded with a report concluding that, in the 19 countries
surveyed, sanctions were largely ineffective for two reasons: employers either were
able to evade responsibility for illegal employment or, once apprehended, were
penalized too little to deter such acts; or the laws generally were not being effectively
enforced because of strict legal constraints on investigations, noncommunication
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Congress was finally right to create sanctions for employers who hired
illegal immigrant, and IRCA was passed.149 However, the success of the
restrictionists against pro-immigration employers was not long-lived. After
the passage of IRCA, Employers took issue with the difficulties they would
now face: not only was it much harder to fill urgent vacancies with foreign
professionals, but the new law apparently also prohibited and punished
employers who refused to hire foreign employees.150 These protests,
however, did not bring about the downfall of IRCA.
The INS responded immediately to its new responsibilities, taking on
hundreds of new attorneys to litigate employer sanctions cases, as well as
examiners and investigators to conduct I-9 audits; the INS began enforcing
the new I-9 requirements with vigor.151 Despite a promising start, the INS
has never properly enforced IRCA’s employer sanctions.152 What happened
next is largely a matter of speculation, but the end result is clear; when the
INS failed to pursue employer sanctions, IRCA failed.153 Rather than focus
on auditing employers’ I-9 forms to issue sanctions from a detached
administrative office, the INS engaged in highly publicized, dramatic
workplace raids.154 The American public was faced with images of poor,
minority laborers being rounded up by an administrative agency, while
their children cried in the background.155 The distaste that the INS’s
enforcement of IRCA created in the United States citizenry resulted in a
major scaling back of the INS’s enforcement capabilities and a refocusing
of the agency’s limited resources on border security, minor I-9 infractions,
and individual removal proceedings.156
According to one immigration attorney practicing at the time, when not
conducting raids that served as publicity disasters, the INS instead focused
on smaller sanctions, often directed at small, unsophisticated employers
who did not understand the I-9 forms.157 The sanctions were small enough
to discourage hiring an attorney to adjudicate a claim, but they were large
between government agencies, lack of enforcement resolve, and lack of personnel.” Id.
149
Interview, supra note 146.
150
See Lawrence Lataif, Manager's Journal: Immigration Law May Alienate Your
Foreign Professional Staff, WALL ST. J., May 11, 1987, at 1; see also supra note 142
and accompanying text.
151
Jeanne Saddler, Businesses Face Big Fines for Breaking Immigration Law, WALL
ST. J., Feb. 10, 1989 at 1.
152
Edward Kennedy Testimony Mar. 29, 2006, supra note 115, at 42:00.
153
“Blunt enforcement tools (border security increases and limits on immigrant
rights) have not quenched employers’ thirst for immigrant workers.” Edward Kennedy
Testimony Mar. 29, 2006, supra note 115, at 42:30.
154
See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
155
Interview, supra note 146.
156
See Matt Moffet, The Gatekeepers: Immigration Service Has Mammoth Task,
Minimal Resources --- Border Patrol in Southwest Lacks Manpower to Cope With
Illegal Immigrants --- Koreans at the Rio Grande, WALL ST. J., May 9, 1985 at 1.
157
See Edward Kennedy Testimony Mar. 29, 2006, supra note 115.
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enough to inspire the employers to complain to their representatives in
Congress.158 Since the vast majority of those sanctioned did not even
employ non-citizens, let alone unauthorized immigrants, the congressmen
with the latest complaint from their constituents would simply ask the INS
district director or the INS director in Washington, D.C. to focus the
agency’s efforts on another state.159 There was no big amendment to IRCA
nor was there an intensive budget cut. What existed was the voices of
hundreds of employers annoyed by the INS’s pinpricks and a public
perception (earned or not) that the INS was hurting families and failing in
their job to shut down the major offenders.160
The 1970 GAO study of similar programs in other countries became a
prediction for IRCA in the United States - low levels of enforcement and
poor inter-agency communication rendered IRCA ineffective at preventing
illegal immigration.161 Once it became clear to employers that the INS
would not be enforcing IRCA in a meaningful way, they became less
cautious about ensuring that immigrant workers had documentation, and
the immigration rates that had fallen directly after 1986 and the “Reagan
Recession,” once again skyrocketed.162 Since the collapse of IRCA, no
other employment-based immigration reform programs have been able to
rally the necessary political support.163 Another reason the IRCA failed is
its requirement that employers act “knowingly” in order to incur
penalties.164 Employers were able to negotiate for this factor in the final law
and have prevailed in court where a mere examination of a document,
without knowledge of whether it is fraudulent or not, defeats sanctions. 165

158

Interview, supra note 146.
Id.
160
Id.
161
In 1994, the US Commission for Immigration Reform raised concerns about
insufficient resources for enforcement of employer sanctions and other labor standards.
See Bruce Brownell, Illegal Immigration Continues Unabated By New Measures --Mexicans Continue to Enter U.S for Work While Jobs Still Go Begging at Home, WALL
ST. J., June 9, 1988 at 1 [Illegal Immigration Continues].
162
Interview, supra note 146. While this rise in immigration rates is related to many
other factors, non-enforcement of the law improved employers’ willingness to ignore it.
163
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”), the agency now tasked with
enforcement of the employer sanctions, is chronically overburdened with enforcing
over 400 statutes, and in-depth, resource-intensive investigations required for many of
them. Other changes in immigration law have been related to national security interests
or agency regulations. See 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a)(1)(A); Schmall, supra note 11, at 378.
164
Prohibiting Employment of Unauthorized Immigrants, supra note 140; see also
supra note 1401 and accompanying text.
165
See, e.g., Collins Foods Int’l, Inc. v. U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Serv.,
948 F.2d 549 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that manager met threshold of rebuttable
presumption against knowingly hiring an undocumented worker where manager
checked employee’s social security, but did not compare it to the examples provided by
INS).
159
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With the creation of “E-Verify,” an electronic database into which
employers can enter a new hire’s information to check that they are
properly authorized to work in the United States, it is even easier for
employers to escape sanctions because it creates a rebuttable presumption
that the employer did not “knowingly” hire an undocumented worker who
passed through E-Verify.166 Once an employee had passed through EVerify, the employer can no longer be sanctioned for “knowingly” hiring
an undocumented worker, even if the employer had provided the
documents to the employee, without additional evidence of wrongdoing.167
The failure to enforce employer sanctions means that employers and
consumers have benefited from low-cost goods, services, and cheap labor,
and, at the same time, Congress was saved the trouble of making
“politically difficult decisions about expanding legal, low-skilled
immigration.”168 Undocumented immigrants found work in every state,
displacing traditional low-wage workers in industries such as construction,
food services, and agriculture.169 By 2006, it was clear that “businesses
depend on undocumented workers to stay in business.”170 Like Chinese and
Japanese workers in the 1800s and Mexican workers in the 1950s, the most
vulnerable immigrants can almost always find work in physically
demanding, low-paying fields that less vulnerable workers are unwilling to
do.171 The Chamber of Commerce has made the same arguments about
undocumented immigrants now as observers made about Chinese
immigrants 150 years ago: “if you kick out 11 million people it will bring
our economy to a screeching halt.”172
Despite its early setbacks, in recent years IRCA enforcement has been
greatly, if quietly, increased. President Barack Obama has focused more on
audits of employers than on workplace raids which, combined with a
drastic downturn in the economy, resulted in the first negative growth in
immigrant populations in decades.173 Some unions have joined the effort,
acknowledging that enforcement of fair labor standards requires that all
workers, regardless of their legal status, be empowered to enforce the labor
laws.174
166

See Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968 (2011).
Id.
168
Edward Kennedy Testimony Mar. 29, 2006, supra note 115, at 43:00.
169
See id. at 43:20.
170
Id. at 43:20.
171
“The Iowa economy is hungry for immigrants who do work that is physically
demanding and dangerous.” Testimony of Sen. Tom Harkin during Senate Session,
1:07:30 (C-Span Mar. 29, 2006), available at http://www.c-spanvideo.org/program/
SenateSession3673&start=2255 [hereinafter Testimony of Tom Harkin].
172
Testimony of Tom Harkin, supra note 171, at 1:10:50 (quoting U.S. Chamber of
Commerce).
173
See Passel, Cohn, & Gonzalez-Barrera, supra note 122, at 6.
174
See Vernon M. Briggs, “Immigration Policy and Organized Labor: A Never167
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Now, the hunger for skilled professionals, which emerged in 1965,
rumbles on. Congress adopted the H-1B visa in an effort to provide
industry with the professionals that America was not producing.175
Recently, efforts have been made to raise the H-1B visa cap to meet the
needs of high tech industry.176 The unprecedented economic growth in the
information technology, hospitality, labor, and construction industries in
2006, much like the railroads of the 1850s and the wartime expansion of
the 1940s, can no longer be sustained without immigrant workers.177 What
happens next is anyone’s guess, but will most likely be a product of all that
has come before.
IV. THE FUTURE: DON’T STOP DREAMING
The next big components of immigration reform are the DREAM178
and Ag Jobs179 acts. Resembling the logic that led to the passage of the
1965 INA, the DREAM Act is based primarily on humanitarian concerns
and a desire to maintain the United States’ competitiveness in skilled labor.
The DREAM Act would grant a path to citizenship for those who came to
the United States as children and who can benefit society as educated
professionals and not as cheap labor. Although, like the 1965 efforts to
encourage skilled immigration, passage of the DREAM Act faces little
employer or union opposition, some reform movements are reluctant to
focus on this highly educated demographic, lest it de-energize the
immigration movement before less skilled workers can benefit. Despite
their concerns regarding the impact on less skilled workers, both employers
and unions appear to have become part of the discussions on
Comprehensive Immigration Reform taking place right now; there is a
focus on bringing the best and the brightest to the United States and on
ensuring that new workers do not threaten the working conditions of
current workers.180
Ceasing Issue,” Cornell University ILR School, Briggs Public Testimonies, at 2 (May
24, 2007) Testimony before the Subcommittee on Immigration of the Judiciary
Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives. Ithaca, NY, available at
http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/briggstestimonies/25/.
175
Testimony of Edward Kennedy during Senate Session, 4:49:38 (C-Span Sep. 21,
2000),
available
at
http://www.c-spanvideo.org/program/SenateSession2538
&start=17367 [hereinafter Edward Kennedy Testimony Sep. 21, 2000].
176
See id., at 4:56:50. (advocating for the increase of the H-1B visa fee to be used for
improving training in IT field for U.S. citizens).
177
Id. at 4:59:00.
178
This bill was most recently seen in the House of Representatives as H. R. 1842 in
2010.
179
This bill was most recently seen in the House of Representatives in 2009 as H.R.
2414.
180
See Ashley Parker, Immigration Talks Hit Snag Over Business and Labor Concerns,
THE CAUCUS: THE POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT BLOG OF THE TIMES (Mar. 22, 2013),
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The Ag Jobs bill has also been making the congressional rounds for
several years.181 It proposes to assist some of the least skilled,
undocumented immigrants and their employers by providing amnesty and a
path to citizenship.182 Discussions of the Ag Jobs bill before Congress are
perhaps some of the most inspiring of the latest immigration reform efforts,
demonstrating the respect that can emerge between employers vulnerable to
even small market shifts and their equally vulnerable employees.183
There are numerous obstacles facing both the DREAM and Ag Jobs
acts and most come from their “amnesty” provisions.184 Criticism of IRCA,
reflected in the current criticism of the DREAM Act and Ag Jobs, revolved
around the ease of obtaining fraudulent documents and the injustice of
granting “amnesty” to some workers while criminalizing the employment
of others.185 IRCA provisions similar to those proposed in the new
legislation drew energetic opposition,186 and opponents of both the
DREAM Act and Ag Jobs have used the failure of IRCA, with its
unpopular “amnesty” provisions, in an attempt to squash the legislation.
Additionally, some opponents to adopting any amnesty in the reform
legislation take issue with the possibility of granting rights to those who
flout the country’s laws by even being present in the United States187
Another recent development in the field of immigrant vulnerability that
was challenged by employers and eventually defeated in Congress, may
help in the analysis: H-2B regulations.
A. Lessons from H-2B Reform: Employers Need Cheap Labor
Recent developments in the H-2B visa program illustrate the influence
of modern employers. It also showcases rhetoric, largely unchanged from
its use in the 1860s, about the need for vulnerable labor. The discussion is
the most recent warning to immigration reformers that new measures will
fail when employers are not on board.
http:// http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/03/22/immigration-talks-hit-snag-overbusiness-and-labor-concerns/?_r=0 (last visited Oct. 27, 2013).
181
See Summary of AgJOBS: The Agricultural Job Opportunities, Benefits and
Security Act of 2007, IMMIGRATION POLICY CENTER (Jan 1, 2008),
http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/just-facts/summary-agjobs-agricultural-jobopportunities-benefits-and-security-act-2007.
182
Id.
183
See generally The House Committee Judiciary on Immigration, Citizenship,
Refugees, Border Security & International Law, Immigrant Farm Workers, at 02:0002:46,
(C-Span,
Sep.
24,
2010),
available
at
http://www.cspanvideo.org/program/295639-1 [hereinafter Immigrant Farm Workers].
184
See generally Immigrant Farm Workers, supra note 183.
185
See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
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Deborah M. Levy, Better Immigration Rules, Not More Patrols, WALL ST. J., Jan.
29, 1986 at 1.
187
Keith Cunningham-Parmeter, supra note 8, at 1363.
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The H-2B visa program, much like the Bracero Program, is used for
importing temporary, non-agricultural work where the Secretary of Labor
has determined that no local workers in the area are willing and/or able to
do the required work.188 How that work shortage is determined has long
been a point of contention between employers and unions, since importing
cheap labor can displace local workers unable to sustain themselves on the
low wages given to temporary workers.189 These workers often live in
dilapidated housing provided by the employer, receive little or no safety
training or equipment, incur massive debt to get to the United States, and
depend entirely on the success of a season in order to earn any wages.190 In
February 2012, the Department of Labor responded to these difficulties by
issuing new regulations to raise the working standards of temporary foreign
workers, which could reduce the incentive for employers to hire outside the
United States, but as these regulations have only recently been adopted, the
depth of their impact have yet to be determined. 191
Much like their predecessors from the 1800s, many employers who
cannot export their production to places with cheaper labor send recruiters
to places with labor to spare, usually South and Central America.192 Under
previous regulations, there was no oversight of these recruiters, who, like
recruiters of the 1800s, often charged laborers illegal headhunting fees and
a premium on the visa application.193 Workers were also responsible for
their own travel expenses, which they typically could not afford without the
aid of a loan shark.194 Since H-2B visas bind workers to the employer who
petitioned for them, if there is not enough work for the number of
employees recruited, the workers have nothing to do for months at a time

188

The employer can prove this by advertising for the jobs for a reasonable period of
time, consulting relevant unions in the area, and establishing that the workers would be
paid the “prevailing wage.” See Laura D. Francis, DOL Issues Final Rule Adding
Worker Protections to H-2B Program, BLOOMBERG BNA (Feb. 14, 2012), available at
www.bna.com/dol-issues-final-n12884907869 [hereinafter DOL Issues Final Rule].
189
See generally Immigrant Farm Workers, supra note 183, at 02:00-02:46.
190
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Derechos Del Migrante, Inc., Picked Apart: The Hidden Struggles of Migrant Worker
Women
in
the
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Industry
(2010),
available
at
http://www.wcl.american.edu/clinical/documents/20100714_auwcl_ihrlc_picked_
apart.pdf?rd=1 [hereinafter Picked Apart].
191
The Department of Labor has to establish that allowing the employer to import
foreign workers will neither displace U.S. workers, nor harm their wages or working
conditions. See Dep’t of Labor Temporary Non-agricultural Employment of H-2B
Aliens in the United States, 77 Fed. Reg. 3058 (Feb. 21, 2012) (to be codified 20
C.F.R. pt. 655, 29 C.F.R. pt. 503), available at http://op.bna.com/dlrcases.nsf/id/lfrs8rcndy/$File/H-2B%20Final%20Rule.pdf. A recent Inspector General report found that
employers regularly lie about their recruitment efforts. See also Costa, supra note 3.
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See Picked Apart, supra note 190.
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Id. at 1.
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Id.
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while their loans gain interest and their employers charge rent.195 The
workers are also much more vulnerable to the whims of the employer than
local workers, since discharge leaves this employee with very little time to
return home before becoming “undocumented”.196
In 2011, responding to overwhelming commentary on the proposed
rule, the DOL issued regulations that require employers to reimburse
employees for visa and travel fees and to pay, at minimum, three quarters
of the wages promised, even when there is no work to be done.197 This
move would protect both migrant workers who are severely disadvantaged
compared to unionized United States workers as well as employers.198 It
would also make United States workers more appealing, since the
employers would not have to risk paying for work not done during a poor
season. The new regulations also respond to the ongoing concern that
imported labor would lower worker safety for an entire industry by
requiring employers to pay for tools and equipment necessary to meet
safety requirements.199 However, since a federal judge in Florida has placed
a preliminary injunction on the regulations pending a challenge by the
Chamber of Commerce, these regulations have yet to be implemented.200
Congress also responded to the pressure of the Chamber and employers by
blocking the three-quarter wage provision until September 30, 2012.201
Employers who depend on H-2B workers have been lobbying Congress to
suspend or remove the new rules, arguing that it is too difficult to fill the
job openings with local workers and that the additional cost of temporary
labor will severely harm business.202 They argue that, in addition to the
hard economic conditions they already face, the new regulations would
magnify impact of a bad season because they would have to pay wages for
hours they did not benefit from. 203
195
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198
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202
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203
The Chamber of Commerce has objected to the ¾ wage requirement since work
hours are often out of the employer’s control, such as bad weather in construction, or a
poor harvest in the crab industry. See Costa, supra note 3; supra note 200; see also
DOL Changes Effective Date, supra note 201.
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B. Ag Jobs: It’s About More Than Just Employment
The Ag Jobs Act204 is a unique reform effort in immigration. It
represents a collaboration between employers and the most vulnerable
immigrants to reduce their susceptibility.205 In addition to reforming the H2A (agricultural guest-workers) visa program, the collaboration proposes to
offer currently undocumented farm workers the chance to earn temporary
legal status, thus providing employers with a stable workforce. 206 Such a
reform would improve the vulnerability of about fifty-five (55) to seventyfive (75) percent of the farm worker workforce estimated to be
undocumented.207 The H-2A program currently operates similarly to H-2B;
agricultural employers may hire temporary farm laborers if they can show
that wages and working conditions of local workers will not be adversely
impacted.208 Ag Jobs would acknowledge the difficulty employers currently
face in recruiting local labor by removing the requirement that employers
first advertise in local labor markets before obtaining visas for foreign
labor. 209
The effort to pass Ag Jobs has been unique, in that agricultural workers
are some of the most notoriously vulnerable immigrants but have found a
way to join their employers in efforts seeking mutually-beneficial
reform.210 Both employers and immigrant workers have gone before
Congress to illustrate the importance of low-wage immigrant workers for
the success of the low-profit agriculture industry.211 Modern employers,
like those of the 1930s and 1950s, argue that they need immigrant labor

204

S. 340/HR 371; H.R. 2414 (111th): AgJOBS Act of 2009, 111th Congress, 2009–
2010. Text as of May 14, 2009 (Introduced), available at http://www.govtrack.us
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205
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IMMIGRATION POLICY CENTER (last visited Jan 1, 2008), http://www.immigrationpolicy
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Movements by migrant worker organizations, such as “Take Our Jobs” have
illustrated that, despite high unemployment rates, local workers are not willing to fill
agricultural jobs.Michael Martin, “Tell Me More: ‘Take My Job!’ Campaign Markets
Agricultural Labor,” National Public Radio, interview Arturo Rodriguez (July 7, 2010)
transcript
available
at
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php
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because, despite high unemployment rates, difficult jobs, such as those in
agriculture, remain unfilled.212 Employers favoring Ag Jobs argue that strict
enforcement of immigration laws would remove seventy percent of the
workforce.213 In fact, these arguments made by agricultural employers
regarding the need for immigrant workers have remained the same since
the days of the Bracero Program.214 After the implementation of IRCA,
farmers lamented that their livelihood was rotting in the fields because they
could not find enough workers once undocumented immigration slowed.215
Since these employers need immigrant labor, if it is too difficult for them to
obtain that labor legally, they will often obtain it illegally. 216 Employers,
therefore, advocate for immigration reform that makes it easier for
immigrant laborers to enter and remain in the country as this reduces
employer liability.
Unions, such as the AFL-CIO, have begun to see the benefit of
recruiting membership in immigrant ranks.217 Union membership has fallen
significantly in recent years,218 and traditionally unionized fields have
become dominated by immigrant labor.219 The traditional, exclusionary
rhetoric of the unions alienates this workforce and reduces their willingness
to join an established union. 220 The AFL-CIO hopes to encourage union
membership and decrease vulnerability by advocating for increased legal
immigration, lenient enforcement of immigration laws, and amnesty for
undocumented workers. 221 However, the relationship between agricultural
employers and workers seen in Ag Jobs demonstrates that, where
employers and employees understand their dependence on one another,
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(analyzing thoroughly the dichotomy between resisting immigration expansion and
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they can unite to try to better their respective positions.222
The vitriolic rhetoric that has resisted admission of immigrants since
the 1860s is alive and well in the halls of Congress today.223 Despite the
proof that no citizen wants the available agricultural jobs, congressmen
argue that immigrants are taking American jobs.224 Members of minority
classes that were displaced by immigrants (sometimes over seventy years
ago)225 argue that any leniency in immigration law will further impoverish
an already heavily unemployed class.226 Indeed, representatives call
undocumented workers “illegals” with the same disdain they used to refer
to Chinese laborers as “coolies” in the 19th century.227 Like the resistance to
the 1965 INA and IRCA, opponents of Ag Jobs urge that these workers are
criminals for entering the country illegally and that they should not be
rewarded for their transgressions with amnesty.228 These voices are the
product of a complicated, yet every-changing, social and political stew.
Perhaps patience, reason, a recovering economy, and electoral change are
all that can defeat these restrictionist sentiments and bring about the
passage of Ag Jobs.
C. DHS Prosecutorial Discretion: Unilaterally DREAMing
Earlier this year, the Obama Administration announced a plan to grant
deferred action229 to undocumented immigrants, under the age of thirty,
who had been brought to the country as children.230 By applying for
222
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Deferred Action, young, deportable people can become eligible for work
permits.231 Since the group affected must have either a high school level of
education or military service and are traditionally more skilled labor, the
decision does not attract the same vitriol from potentially displaced local
workers as has H-2B and AgJobs.232 It has, however, received the same
criticism that Ag Jobs received for being an “amnesty,” despite the
difference that it offers no path to citizenship.233 Until Congress passes
legislation permanently granting relief to this group of people, the
DREAMers’ best option is to register as an undocumented immigrant with
the United States Citizenship and Immigration Service (“USCIS”) and hope
that they qualify for discretion, rather than removal.234
Many of the arguments made in favor of the DREAM Act are similar
to those used in passing the 1965 INA:235
We have, in these tough economic times [. . .] about two
million high-wage, high-skill jobs that are unfilled today
because we don't have the talent to fill those jobs. And
when we have all these smart, talented, young people, who
ha[ve] the potential to fill those jobs and then be
productive citizens and to pay taxes and to contribute to
society, to deny that opportunity doesn't make sense. [. . .]
[T]he Congressional Budget Office, [. . .] has estimated
that over the next 10 years, if we educate these young
people, if we allow them to go to college, this will actually
reduce the deficit by a billion dollars because of their
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group who speak English, have no ties to their country of nationality, are no threat to
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societal services like education and want to give back. Perhaps the appeal in helping
the DREAMers obtain legal status lies more in their value as a politically palatable
group of people who share the American Dream, than in a cold calculation of their
benefit to employers. The 1965 INA also relied on an emotional component, riding on
the wave of a Civil Rights movement that sought to make the U.S. fairer for everyone.
The heart of the argument in favor of passing the DREAM act appears to be that
denying these people legal status is, simply, “not fair.” However, an analysis of fairness
and the political appeal of a group that has little bearing on Employer interest in the
DREAMers is beyond the scope of this piece.
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increased productivity.236
Opponents fear that granting such an “amnesty” will encourage more
parents to bring their children to the United States in hopes that they can
gain citizenship.237 These opponents cite the current economic downturn
and protest allowing those who have broken immigration laws to compete
with lawful workers for the limited jobs available.238 Meanwhile,
proponents argue that it is self-defeating to deport those who only benefit
American society, had no control over their illegal entry, have no ties in
their country of origin, and in whom society has invested its educational,
and other, resources.239 DREAM, like the 1965 INA, may require a
powerhouse like Senator Ted Kennedy and a nationwide civil rights
movement to get past the vocal opponents of the DREAM Act. However, if
the DREAMers can get past the ideological opposition to their cause, they
may benefit from employing some of the tactics that have either proven
successful, or almost proven successful for others: (1) work with unions to
advocate for legal status for vulnerable workers;240 (2) collaborate with
employers who want highly educated workers to enable them to create
more jobs;241 and (3) change the discussion from one of fear about the
effect of “illegals” competing with United States workers for jobs to one of
what is best for the country.242
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D. The 2012 Election Cycle:
The Powerhouse Immigration Reform Needs?
In the lead-up to the 2012 Presidential Election, President Obama and
conservative members of Congress began to battle over the issue of
immigration reform. The President had made campaign promises, during
the 2008 election, to push for immigration reform. By the summer of 2011,
the President faced significant pressure, particularly from the Latino
community, to keep these promises.243 Congress, however, had been
unwilling to cooperate with any such efforts. Thus, the President exercised
his power as head of the Executive Branch, instructing the enforcement
agency, Immigration, Customs and Enforcement (“ICE”) and ICE’s parent
agency, the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) to exercise
prosecutorial discretion and issuing Deferred Action for those low-priority
undocumented immigrants who would qualify under the DREAM Act.244
What followed was an irrational debate about the propriety of this
presidential decision, particularly from conservative members of Congress.
Several commentators have largely blamed this irrational debate for the
Republican Party’s loss in the 2012 Presidential Election.245 As a result, the
Republican Party has recently expressed a new willingness to consider
immigration reform efforts and compromise on previously divisive issues,
such as “amnesty” for some who entered the country illegally.246 This newfound acceptance of illegal immigrants may be the key to passing effective,
bi-partisan legislation.
243

See Executive Authority to grant administrative relief for DREAM Act
beneficiaries, NATIONAL IMMIGRATION LAW CENTER (May 28, 2012)
www.nilc.org/document.html?id=754; see also Cesar Vargas, DREAM Act: Yes You
Can, Mr. President, THE HILL’S CONGRESS BLOG (May 31, 2012),
http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/judicial/230347-dream-act-yes-you-can-mrpresident.
244
This decision was justified by the fact that ICE only has the resources to deport
400,000 undocumented immigrants each year, though there are an estimated 11 million
undocumented immigrants in the U.S. The decision to focus on those immigrants who
were dangerous, and had made the decision to come to the U.S. unlawfully was
presented as an effort to focus limited resources where they would most benefit society.
See Napolitano, supra note 230; see also John Morton, Exercising Prosecutorial
Discretion Consistent with the Civil Immigration Enforcement Priorities of the Agency
for the Apprehension, Detention and Removal of Aliens, U.S. IMMIGRATION AND
CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT (June 17, 2011), http://www.ice.gov/doclib/securecommunities/pdf/prosecutorial-discretion-memo.pdf.
245
See Dana Bash and Tom Cohen, Possible Compromise on Immigration Reform
takes Shape, CNN POLITICS (Jan. 28, 2013), available at http://www.cnn.com/
2013/01/28/politics/immigration-reform.
246
See Senate Bipartisan Framework for Comprehensive Immigration Reform
CSPAN (Jan. 28, 2013), available at http://www.c-span.org/uploaded Files/
Content/Documents/Bipartisan-Framework-For-Immigration-Reform.pdf [hereinafter
Senate Bipartisan Framework].

2013]

IMMIGRATION AND THE VULNERABLE WORKER

557

Discussions about “fixing” the immigration system now focus on
security and the economy.247 Three of the four pillars of a framework
proposed by a bipartisan committee of senators are: “Attracting the
World’s Best and Brightest,” “Strong Employment Verification,” and
“Admitting New Workers While Protecting Worker’s Rights.”248 The
President has submitted his own proposal, focusing on workers and a
lawful path to citizenship.249 Both proposals focus on simplifying the
system, making it easier for employers to abide by the law, and ensuring
that those who enter the country can do so legally and as a benefit to the
country.
As in 1965, the “Best and Brightest” of 2013 are those who will
supposedly build the American economy and encourage innovation.250 In
1965, the skilled worker was supposed to “create jobs” and bring skills that
America’s institutes of higher education could not fully supply. Now, these
skilled workers are originating in America’s graduate program but are
unable to remain in the United States thanks to visa backlogs and a
byzantine system that prevents students from immigrating permanently.251
Both immigration reform proposals recognize the difficulty the current
system places upon both employers and immigrants, as the government
seeks to keep those immigrants trained within the country, while still
offering a solution to streamline the process.
IRCA’s employment verification system, the I-9, has proven
inadequate to the monumental task of preventing unauthorized workers
from undercutting United States workers, which was the lynchpin of
IRCA’s hoped-for success. The Bipartisan Committee’s efforts to reform
the Employment Verification system appear to be another effort to address
illegal immigration by cutting off the main attraction - jobs.252 This
provision focuses on ease of use and procedural protections, which appear
to address IRCA’s failure to target those employers who are acting in bad
faith but still make it easier for honest employers to abide by the law.253
While the framework is not specific as to how this will be done, the
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wording focuses on fining employers who “knowingly hire” undocumented
workers, indicating that Congress has learned something from IRCA’s
collapse and the hazards of penalizing employers arbitrarily.254
The protection of workers’ rights, while allowing for the admission of
new workers, appears to address the concerns temporary, seasonal, and
unskilled employers have had regarding the H visa system as well as the
concerns unions have always had with immigrant workers.255 Perhaps this
provision will be easier to shape now that some unions have begun to
embrace immigrant workers and, so, may collaborate with Congress to
ensure that effective programs are put in place to actually “ensure strong
labor protections” and prevent the exploitation H workers currently face.256
Enforcement of labor laws for all workers impacted by the eleven
million undocumented workers in the United States requires supervision by
government agencies and a private right of action.257 Vulnerable workers
often cannot access a private right of actions without the assistance of trade
unions, who can help workers either pay for individual lawsuits or enforce
collectively bargained rights and minimum labor standards.258
V. CONCLUSION
Perhaps the most important lesson learned from this journey through
history is that, even with all the right alliances between workers and
employers, there is enough room in the immigration debate for the naysayers to get a foothold. However, no wave lasts forever, and even those
opposed to the 1965 INA eventually gave way. Hope may be gleaned from
the fact that proponents of the DREAM act are using the same language
that proved effective in 1965, “we [should] turn away from an irrational
and irrelevant concern with the place of an immigrant's birth, and turn
instead to a meaningful concern with the contribution immigrants can make
to this society.”259 But above all else, the H-2B regulations and IRCA all
teach reformers that no amount of good political fortune can protect an
immigration law from violation when employers are worried about their
bottom line. The 1965 INA and Ag Jobs show, however, that when
employers interests are promoted in tandem with employee rights and a
254
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benevolent political climate, lasting change for the better can be achieved.
Hopefully, as Congress and the President turn to the issue of
Comprehensive Immigration Reform this year, they will keep these lessons
in mind. Otherwise, we may just have to do it all again in another 30 years.

